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Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and Corresponding
Market Activity
We assess the impact of spam that touts stocks upon the trading activity of those stocks
and sketch how proﬁtable such spamming might be for spammers and how harmful it
is to those who heed advice in stock-touting e-mails. We ﬁnd convincing evidence that
stock prices are being manipulated through spam. We suggest that the e ectiveness
of spammed stock touting calls into question prevailing models of securities regulation
that rely principally on the proper labeling of information and disclosure of conﬂicts
of interest as means of protecting consumers, and we propose several regulatory and
industry interventions.
Based on a large sample of touted stocks listed on the Pink Sheets quotation
system and a large sample of spam emails touting stocks, we ﬁnd that stocks experience
a signiﬁcantly positive return on days prior to heavy touting via spam. Volume of trading
responds positively and signiﬁcantly to heavy touting. For a stock that is touted at some
point during our sample period, the probability of it being the most actively traded stock
in our sample jumps from 4% on a day when there is no touting activity to 70% on a
day when there is touting activity. Returns in the days following touting are signiﬁcantly
negative. The evidence accords with a hypothesis that spammers “buy low and spam
high,” purchasing penny stocks with comparatively low liquidity, then touting them –
perhaps immediately after an independently occurring upward tick in price, or after
having caused the uptick themselves by engaging in preparatory purchasing – in order
to increase or maintain trading activity and price enough to unload their positions at a
proﬁt. We ﬁnd that proliﬁc spamming greatly a ects the trading volume of a targeted
stock, drumming up buyers to prevent the spammer’s initial selling from depressing the
stock’s price. Subsequent selling by the spammer (or others) while this buying pressure
subsides results in negative returns following touting. Before brokerage fees, the average
investor who buys a stock on the day it is most heavily touted and sells it 2 days after the
touting ends will lose close to 5.5%. For those touted stocks with above-average levels of
touting, a spammer who buys on the day before unleashing touts and sells on the day
his or her touting is the heaviest, on average, will earn 4.29% before transaction costs.
For access to our raw data and interactivecharts showing price and volume changes
for individual touted and control stocks, see:
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/stockspam>1 Introduction
Unsolicited e-mail is said to account for over 80% of all Internet e-mail tra c, with
estimates topping 1.6 billion messages per week. 15% of these are stock touts.1 Stock-
touting spam asks a user to invest in a speciﬁc stock, and often concedes in its ﬁne print
that the spammer has a ﬁnancial interest in touting those stocks. When they invest in
a stock in which the spammer (or the spammer’s client) holds a stake, spam recipients
can maintain or drive up the price during the spammer’s selling so that the stock can be
liquidated at a proﬁt. For example, in a well-known case brought by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, it was found that stock touter Jonathan Lebed routinely
purchased stock accounting for anywhere from 17% to 46% of the stock’s market volume
for a day, and sent spammed e-mail touts on the same day. He then lodged limit orders
to sell for the next day’s trading session, anticipating a rise in the stock price after the
general public receivedhis touts and some recipients acted on them (In Re Lebed (2000)).
(Lebed’s case and subsequent settlement with the S.E.C. focused on his failure to disclose
his own ﬁnancial interest in the securitieshe touted; as discussed below, stock touts today
often include such disclosures).
We match price and volume data from Pink Sheets, LLC to ticker symbols that
appear in e-mail touts received by one of the authors and by the moderated Internet
Usenet newsgroup news.admin.net-abuse.sightings (NANAS) between January of 2004
and July of 2005, and compare the presence and volume of spam that touts particular
stocks with the price and volume behavior of those stocks before, during, and after the
touts. The stocks in our sample tend to be touted over several days, and we ﬁnd that, on
average, there is a signiﬁcant increase in stock price from the day before touting begins to
the day with the most active touting. Volume also responds positively and signiﬁcantly
to heavy touting. Returns in the days following touting are signiﬁcantly negative.
1See <http://www.postini.com/stats>. See also Sophos Security Threat Management Report
(2006), available at <http://www.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/papers/sophos-security-report-jun06-
srus.pdf>, and <http://www.junk-o-meter.com/stats/index.php>.
1The touted stocks in our sample are nearly always found listed on the Pink Sheets
market, and sometimes additionally on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board market
(OTCBB). They are not listed on any major exchange, nor are they traded in large
total dollar amounts, making them amenable to manipulation. Any mispricing that is
created by trading in response to touting may persist since liquidity risk in these stocks
is high which, in the absence of a tout-created market, may partially preclude arbitrage.
Though we have no way of directly knowing if the spammer actually has holdings in
the spammed stock apart from the spammer’s own admission, when it appears, and our
surmise that some pecuniary motive inspires sending the spam, the evidence accords with
a hypothesis that spammers tout stocks in order to increase trading activity and price
enough to unload their positions at a proﬁt. Selling pressure on the part of the spammer
then results in negative returns following heavy touting. These results are consistent
with the model of Hong and Huang (2005) that suggests that, in highly illiquid markets
(like Pink Sheets), traders with signiﬁcant liquidity needs have an incentive to take costly
actions that increase liquidity and decrease the impact of their trades.
Spam is comparatively cheap to send. Since 2002, relationships between spammers
and virus authors have caused millions of virus-infected personal computers to be
harnessed as “zombies” to send spam,2 further lowering its cost. In addition, unlike most
other commercial spam, stock touts do not call for any direct (and therefore traceable)
Internet-mediated reply from the person spammed, such as the sending of money to
purchase a “spamvertised” product. Stock-touting spammers are therefore particularly
di cult to identify and punish by private anti-spam consortia or public authorities –
reducing even more the cost of sending such spam. However, stock touts do call for action
by their recipients, in the form of purchases placed in ﬁnancial markets. If the volume
of such purchases is high enough, it ought to be reﬂected in the price and/or volume
information recorded for that market. Stock touting spam thus provides a unique way
to measure how e ective spam can be.
2For a discussion of this, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3107613.stm> and
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2987558.stm>.
2A connection between touting and short-term price movementsor volume suggests
ine ciency in some parts of the securities market, with trading taking place not on the
basis of underlying fundamentals, but rather thanks to misconceptions by some of those
spammed with touts – people who not only read their spam and believe its contents, but
who then undertake the e ort to issue instructions to a broker to purchase the touted
stock. In addition, the fact that Pink Sheets stocks are so inexpensive per share may
attract amateur investors to this market. We ﬁnd that the monetary value of the a ected
transactions that take place on Pink Sheets is generally small compared to that on the
major exchanges – or to other notable methods of market manipulation. This makes a
case for regulatory prioritizationmore di cult, evenas touting is a phenomenon that may
a ect the most vulnerable of investors. Given the growth in the number of inexperienced
individuals in the market, the potential for abuse is signiﬁcant even as the dollar value
in a given cycle of spamming is less than $100,000.
The successes of spam touting that we document do, however, raise questions
about the right scope and depth of government-sponsored consumer protection in an
era in which the Internet has enabled both the ready reception of stock touts and
corresponding one-click investing by amateurs who previously would have had brokers or
other intermediariesto temper actions arising from their susceptibility to scams. Many of
the stock-touting e-mails that we examine contain disclosures that the spammer would
sell his or her own shares contemporaneously with the spam campaign, perhaps as a
result of a campaign by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000 to crack
down on stock touting by those who failed to disclose their own holdings in the touted
stocks.3 Regulatory regimes that rely only on disclosure of information to investors who
will then rationally weigh it may prove ine ective when the investors in question are so
clearly disregarding what disclosures might be present.
Finally, successful spam touting calls into question the very notion that spam is
3The SEC campaign is described in Walker and Levine (2001), of which the Lebed case described in
the Introduction is a part.
3in fact unwanted by the recipient. Recipients may wish to avoid spam generally, but
at least some part of the Internet public appears to be hungry for investing advice and
information, enough so to absorb and follow advice that is ﬂatly against interest and
delivered in one of the most reviled formats of the information age. In this, our results
are consistent with Merton (1987) who, based on the observation that individual and
institutional investors each hold just a small proportion of the universe of traded equities,
assumes that investorsonly invest in those securitieswith which they are familiar. Indeed,
touting a stock via spam is a mechanism by which a spammer can make a potential
investor aware of a previously unheard-of company. Given that most ﬁrms listed on Pink
Sheets are unknown to most investors, Merton’s recognition hypothesis lends itself well
to the notion behind touting in order to draw attention to an obscure stock. Our method
cannot directly expose investor intent or behavior. Instead, we show that markets move
in response to spamming e orts, suggesting that enough people fail to ﬁlter spam, and
then read it, and then act upon it, to make spamming worthwhile. Evidence that touting
stocks by spam “works” under the right circumstances helps to complete the puzzle of
why spam is so voluminous.
The paper proceeds as follows. The data and method are reviewed in Section 2.
Results are presented in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we provide a discussion and
consider policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review, Data, and Method
2.1 Literature Review
Previous literature has covered investor response to new information. For example,
studying earnings surprises, Lee (1992) ﬁnds that individual investors tend to buy stock
in reaction to the release of news, whether the news is positive or negative. This
suggests that small investors may place more weight on the mere presence of news than
on its information content. Barber and Odean (2005) ﬁnd that individual investors
4buy signiﬁcantly after “attention-drawing” events, such as a news release about a given
company or a day that a stock experiences an extreme abnormal return. The stocks that
they purchase often subsequently underperform those that they sell. Antweiler and Frank
(2004) study the market response to messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging
Bull message boards about Dow Jones Industrial Average companies. They show that,
besides predicting increased trading, signiﬁcant postings about a stock are followed by
statistically signiﬁcant negative returns. This result suggests that many individuals who
act on news (at least that posted on message boards) are trading at a disadvantage, if not
outright irrationally. Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) build upon this, showing that,
by reacting to “information” that is not relevant to a ﬁrm’s risk or fundamental value
(in particular, purchasing shares of a stock that added “.com” to its name during the
Internet boom), investors cause predictable patterns in volume and returns. Benabou
and Laroque (1992) show that some insiders and others with privileged information
can manipulate markets through distorted announcements because it can be di cult to
determine whether such announcements are true, and because investors are especially
attuned to announcements from seemingly credible sources.
While this literature examines response of investors to news and information that
they seek to obtain, in this paper we examine their response to news that broader
audiences passively receive, news of apparently no substantive validity. Here we look
at stock touting that much less purports or appears to come from a credible source, and
that is sent through a channel – e-mail spam – that is not a typical means for corporate
communication of ﬁnancial data. For market manipulation generally, Aggarwal and Wu
(2003) create a model of market manipulation not speciﬁc to any particular means and
ﬁnd that manipulated stocks are less liquid and smaller than non-manipulated stocks,
and are often listed in markets like OTCBB and Pink Sheets.
Concurrent working papers by B¨ ohme & Holz (2006) and Hanke and Hauser (2006)
analyze the relationship between spammed stock touts and market movements. We
compare our results and methods to theirs below. Additionally, some Internet users have
5tracked the performance of the stocks for which they received spam touts to see what
happens to the value of the stock in the period around spamming.4
2.2 Spam Data
To perform our analysis, we extracted stock-touting spam messages from a large quantity
of unsorted spam. Our initial data set consisted of a database of 1,802,016 spam
messages culled from two sources: 26,273 messages were from the collected spam of
one of this paper’s authors, and 1,775,743 were retrieved from the Internet usenet
newsgroup news.admin.net-abuse.sightings (NANAS).5 We ﬁrst automatically extracted
messages that appeared to be stock touts. This was done by selecting messages that
met two conditions: (1) the message contained the word “stock,” and (2) the message
contained a ticker symbol-like word. Ticker symbol-like words were deﬁned as sequences
of four uppercase letters that were not common English words or abbreviations.6 This
procedure identiﬁed 75,415 messages containing 28,803 di erent symbol-like words and
dated between August 22, 2000, and August 2, 2005. The messages scanned were
plain text rather than graphical image spam, which has become prevalent since 2005,
presumably to foil spam ﬁlters attempting to scan text.
4See, for example, Joshua Cyr’s <http://www.spamstocktracker.com>, Leonard Richardson’s
<http://www.crummy.com/features/StockSpam>, or <http://www.thetruthasiseeit.com> by A. D.
Freduenheim.
5NANAS is used for the purpose of alerting network administrators to spam in progress so that
they might take action against it, and its archives contain time-stamped reports of spam from Internet
users around the world. Reports to NANAS may result in actions taken against the spam. If such
actions reduce the amount of identical spam in a batch reaching other recipients, it could reduce the
e ectiveness of stock-touting spam, making our results understated in comparison to spam that eludes
NANAS reporting. While other stock spam may therefore have a larger market impact, the impact of
NANAS may be limited, since spammed stock touts appear to be intended for immediate consumption
against which subsequent ﬁltering is ine ective. There is no way to assure that NANAS’s archive is a
representative cross-section of spam from around the world, but its contributors are found worldwide,
and judgments can be made within the NANAS group between stocks touted very little, garnering few
spam reports, or stocks touted heavily enough that multiple reports of the spam are found from di erent
reporters.
6In practice, excluding English words and abbreviations was useful, as those words dominated the
data when not excluded, and fewer than 3% of ticker symbol names on Pink Sheets are English words
or abbreviations.
6Next we identiﬁed which of these 75,415 messages were actual touts and what
stocks were being touted. Because the automated process was prone to false positives,
many of the messages identiﬁed were not actual touts, and many messages touting only
one stock contained several symbol-like words, we processed messages by hand. In the
author’s spam, we found that only 10 of all the spammed tickers were listed on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ, and the bulk of tickers we analyzed were not so listed. We therefore
chose to exclude these from our analysis and focused on stocks in less liquid markets.
Thus, we composed a list of ticker symbols of all companies listed on the Pink Sheets
and OTCBB markets (4,741 and 3,388 securities, respectively), and we considered only
messages containing those symbols.
Rather than look at each message individually, we grouped messages by date of
receipt and symbol.7 We hand processed 7,347 groups of messages, and found that 3,813
groups were actual touts. Because price data was not available for all the stocks we
identiﬁed, our ﬁnal list was reduced to 3,669 symbol-date groups. Of these 3,669 symbol-
date pairs, we found over 500 distinct stocks that were touted, all of which were listed on
Pink Sheets, and at least 186 were also listed on OTCBB. Most were touted infrequently:
373 were touted fewer than ten di erent days (of which, 141 were touted only once); only
15 stocks were touted 30 or more di erent days. The number of messages in each symbol-
date grouping is also relevant, as touts that were distributed more widely were likely to
make multiple appearances in our database. For the vast majority of symbol-date pairs,
few messages were received: out of the 3,813 pairs, fewer than ten messages were received
for 3,049 pairs (and for 1,489 of these, only one message was received). Yet, a substantial
number were touted heavily: for 95 pairs, ﬁfty or more messages were received.8
7For example, all messages containing the symbol “CWTD” received on February 13, 2004 were
placed into a group, and representative messages were sampled to see if the presence of the symbol
reﬂected an actual tout. Many messages contained more than one symbol, and so those messages were
placed into multiple groups accordingly.
8B¨ ohme & Holz (2006) and Hanke and Hauser (2006) perform similar studies. These studies
also face the task of developing an archive of stock touting spam. Both draw upon a database
of spam e-mails compiled by Leonard Richardson, who runs a web site that automates the
process of comparing a given stock spam to that stock’s performance on the day of receipt (see
¡http://www.crummy.com/features/StockSpam/reports/¿). Richardson describes his stock spam as a
72.3 Stock Data
We also gathered trading data about the spammed stocks in our sample. All but a
handful of the touted stocks are traded on Pink Sheets, LLC. Pink Sheets is a principal
provider of trading information for over-the-counter stocks and bonds not listed with
major exchanges or NASDAQ. Unlike markets for other over-the-counter stocks (e.g.,
OTCBB, which is operated and regulated by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD)), Pink Sheets neither imposes substantive standards for the listing of
its securities, nor does Pink Sheets regulate the market. To be quoted on Pink Sheets, a
company simply ﬁnds an SEC-registered market maker who is a member of the NASD
and who is willing to quote the stock. As a lister of stocks that include ﬁrms with low
capitalization and day-to-day market volume, Pink Sheets may be an attractive venue
for manipulative activity. Further, some o erings of stock may be modest enough to
not require formal SEC registration and regular reporting. While Pink Sheets-listed
companies are still subject to the requirements of the securities laws, the absence of
registration means that they are more di cult to oversee, and an absence of regular
SEC disclosure reports provides fewer opportunities for prosecution of misleading or
incomplete statements made to investors.9 Finally, smaller companies may have fewer
resources to monitor and police unusual trades of their stock in the marketplace.
Perhaps due to the lack of publicly available bulk historical trading data, there
has been relatively little research on Pink Sheets stocks (Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio
(2004)). Upon our request, Pink Sheets, LLC providedus with archival data from January
of 2004 through July of 2005 on the price, volume, and bid-ask spreads for all the stocks
concatenation of his own personally-received spam and that received by other e-mail addresses he has
created speciﬁcally for the purpose of drawing spam. Both B¨ ohme & Holz (2006) and Hanke and Hauser
(2006) use data from January 2005 through December 2005; the former study uses 21,935 of Richardson’s
touts, while the latter does not specify the total number of touts they examine. Our tout data are derived
from reports of spam of global internet users in the more comprehensive NANAS database.
9Financial data for companies listed on Pink Sheets is limited, though a dealer is required to examine
some of the ﬁnancial statements before quoting the stock. Thus, for the stocks we study, it may be
possible to obtain Rule §240.15c2-11 ﬁlings. Future research might seek to uncover correlations between
company ﬁnancial data and susceptibility to spammed stock touting.
8we found touted in our sample. We did not have ready access to standardized accounting
data on the touted ﬁrms,10 making it nearly impossible to match ﬁrms based on speciﬁc
characteristics such as book-to-market value.11 Thus, we also acquired data on 1000
randomly selected Pink Sheets securities. We use this sample as a set of control ﬁrms in
our analysis. Because one stock had a price of $130 (whereas the 99th percentile price
of the touted stocks was $8.35), we imposed the conservative restriction that the price
of all control stocks be less than $15 so that the control sample was reasonably aligned
with the touted stocks. After ensuring that none of the randomly selected Pink Sheets
stocks had been reported as having touting activity over our sample period, 525 control
stocks remained.12
In reviewing the data, we ﬁnd that spam touts typically occur in temporal groups
– NANAS reports indicate that touting is on average made over a course of a few days.
This might not represent intentional continuing touts by the spammer, but rather the
fact that much spamming takes place by “zombie” PCs that are infected with viruses
and then instructed to send the spam. Once the spam is sent, the spammer may have
little incentive to retract the original instructions sent to the zombie, since the zombie’s
future actions are no longer relevant to a completed market manipulation scheme.
In our analysis we cluster tout spam that continued for a few days: we label each
period of continual touting as a “group.” For example, if a given stock is touted for three
consecutive days, the three days of touting would be denoted as one group. Similarly, if a
stock is only touted on one day, that day forms its own group. We identify any instances
10We ﬁrst sought to obtain pricing and market data freely accessible online, but found such sources
as Yahoo! Finance market data to be incomplete. B¨ ohme & Holz (2006) found the same problem, and
were compelled to reduce their sample size of touted stocks from 391 to 111 tickers (and from 21,935 to
7,606 spam e-mails) because of unavailable data.
11B¨ ohme & Holz (2006) faced the same problem in ﬁnding a suitable market baseline to which to
compare touted stock activity. They chose daily market indices: Standard & Poor’s 500, NASDAQ
Composite, and Russell’s daily microcap, which includes stocks with comparatively low liquidity. We
choose the approach described within this paper to avoid the mismatch between these indices and the
lightly-traded and thus volatile individual stocks that are the target of touters, but also compare with
the Russell microcap for robustness.
12Later in the analysis, this number is further reduced because price or volume data was not available
for the date of comparison with a touted stock.
9of more than ﬁve consecutive trading days without any further touting as the end of a
group (our results are not sensitive to changing the length of this period). Within each
group, we also identify the peak day of touting, represented by the day with the largest
number of recorded touts in that group. Though we cannot observe the trading behavior
of the spammer, for the purposes of testing whether spamming can be proﬁtable to the
touter, we take the peak day of spamming (day zero in the analysis that follows) as the
one directly intended by the spammer in which to initiate selling the stock. To the extent
that the day of heaviest touting does not correspond with the day the spammer planned,
since control over e-mail distribution by zombie PCs may be inexact, the spammer may
proﬁt less. In this circumstance, however, we will see that the correlation between heavy
touting and market behavior remains – the market responds to the actual volume and
concentration of touts as they happen, regardless of when they were intended by the
spammer to happen.
2.4 Method
After matching the Pink Sheets price and volume data with the tout data, for each touted
stock on the day of the tout, we randomly select one stock from the randomly selected set
of Pink Sheets non-touted stocks to serve as a control stock. The number of observations
for our control ﬁrms does not exactly match the number for our touted stocks since Pink
Sheets securities are usually thinly traded, and sometimes not traded at all. If no data are
available, we drop the stock from the sample. In Table 1, we present summary statistics
for the full sample, the touted stocks, and the control stocks. On average, prices for the
touted stocks are signiﬁcantly lower than for the control stocks. Speciﬁcally, the mean
price for touted stocks is $0.67, while that for the control stocks is $0.99. This di erence
is statistically signiﬁcant, as indicated by a t-statistic of  3.19. Share volume for touted
stocks, however, is slightly higher than it is for control stocks (2.88 v. 2.24 thousand,
respectively). A t-statistic testing for a di erence in mean volume suggests that this
di erence is also signiﬁcant (t = 7.84). For completeness, we report the statistics on
10bid-ask spreads where they are found, but these numbers shed little light on the analysis
except to emphasize the frequent illiquidity of the stocks. The spread information is for
unconsummated transactions, and alone does not indicate how much was paid by a buyer
or accepted by a seller for any shares of the stock analyzed. Standard deviations are
enormous, and means and medians for price and spreads, in particular, are signiﬁcantly
di erent, suggesting a presence of outliers and a skewed distribution. In the next section,
we examine the statistical as well as the economic signiﬁcance to mitigate the concern
that might accompany such data volatility. Speciﬁcally, we use generalized least squares
regressions with clustered standard errors to examine the relationship between returns
and trading activity around touting activity. Statistical signiﬁcance persists despite the
presence of such large deviations.
3 Results
3.1 Primary Results
We begin our analysis by examining whether a tout results in abnormal trading volume.
Table 2 shows that it does. To perform this exercise, we note that we have stocks that are
touted at some point during the sample period (touted stocks), as well as stocks that are
never touted during the sample period (control stocks). Moreover, there are some days
in our sample when no stock is touted (Tout Day = No), and some days in our sample
when there is a stock tout (Tout Day = Yes). Table 2, Panel A shows the likelihood of
a touted or control stock having the greatest dollar value of trading activity (i.e., price
multiplied by volume) on a day when there is or is not touting.13 For our sample, on days
when there actually is a stock tout (Tout Day = Yes), it is much more likely that one of
13To do this analysis, on each day, we rank stocks by dollar value of trading activity. We form a new
dataset which keeps only the most actively traded stock from each day. We then generate the values in
Table 2 by obtaining summary statistics from this new sample for each type of stock (touted or control)
on each type of day (tout day or not). The analysis is done similarly in Panel B, using dollar value of
abnormal trading activity. Note that ranking by di erent variables in Panels A and B yields a di erent
number of observations for each type of stock/type of day.
11the touted stocks (as opposed to one of the control stocks) is the stock with the highest
dollar value of trading activity: 70% vs 30%. Instead, on days when there are no touts
(Tout Day = No), one of the control stocks is much more likely to be the most actively
traded stock: 96% vs 4%. Table 2, Panel B is similar but measures trading activity in
terms of dollar value of abnormal trading activity (price multiplied by abnormal volume,
where abnormal volume is a stock’s volume on day t less its mean volume over the sample
period, standardized by mean volume). This panel shows that on days when the sample
stocks are touted, the probability of one of them being the most actively traded stock
is signiﬁcantly higher than it is for one of the control stocks (74% vs 26%). On days
when there is no touting activity, it is much more likely that one of the control stocks is
the most actively traded stock (63% vs 37%).14 These results suggest that touting does
cause trading activity.
We present summary statistics for our touted stocks and the set of control stocks
in Table 3. The number of observations for our control ﬁrms does not exactly match the
number for our touted stocks since Pink Sheets securities are usually thinly traded, and
sometimes not traded at all. If no data are available, we drop the stock from the sample.
To verify that our results are not driven by thinly-traded stocks and bid-ask bounce, we
evaluate midpoint returns. Because of the issue with reported closing spreads discussed
above, however, we conﬁrm in unreported results that these numbers are similar if we
simply use closing prices to calculate returns. Additionally, because we anticipate that
investors who receive spam may buy the touted stock on the day they receive the e-mail
or may purchase the subsequent day, in the analysis that follows, we examine return
behavior up to two days following the touting.15
Over the period from the day before touting activity begins through the peak
14Though one might infer from Table 2 that spammers tout speciﬁcally during low volume periods
for their stock, which may also correspond to periods of low trading activity for the market as a whole,
we note that in this initial analysis we do not distinguish between days with only one tout versus those
days with several touts for a given stock. We address this issue later in the paper.
15We also examine returns on the following day (as opposed to the following two days) and ﬁnd that
returns are still signiﬁcantly lower than they are for the control group.
12day of touting, returns for touted stocks are, on average, 70 basis points higher per day
than they are for control stocks. However, following the peak day, average returns are
1.06% lower per day for touted stocks. Again, note that these are midpoint returns, so
they are unlikely to be driven by bid-ask bounce. In Section 4, we examine potential
proﬁts and losses to spammers after accounting for anticipated transaction costs. The
di erence in returns to touted stocks relative to non-touted stocks leading up to peak
day is signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.74) and, subsequent to peak
day, this di erence is signiﬁcantly negative (t-statistic =  3.55).16 We also consider
“benchmark-adjusted” returns rather than simply compare them to a set of control
stocks. Pink Sheets stocks are dissimilar from those within the stock indices traded
on a major exchange, so ﬁnding an appropriate benchmark with which to adjust returns
is di cult. Nonetheless, we compare returns with the return on Russell Micro-cap Index.
Results are qualitatively unchanged, and are available upon request.17
Volume is signiﬁcantly higher on the peak day of touting for touted stocks than
it is prior to the peak day – average abnormal volume increases by over 50% from 0.40
during the period before to 0.65 on the peak day of touting activity – suggesting that
touting induces trading activity.18 We interpret our results to suggest that spammers
tout the stock in order to encourage buying pressure and trading activity, making the
stock liquid enough to sell (see Baker and Stein (2004)).
Thus far, our results accord with the notion that after a modest but positive price
increase – possibly one caused by their own anticipatory buying of the sort in which
Lebed engaged (In Re Lebed (2000)) – spammers tout stocks. Reﬂecting sell activity
that outstrips spam-induced temporary demand, returns for touted stocks subsequently
16Because we use “groups” of touts as a single event, we are not concerned about correlation arising
from overlapping observations a ecting our results. Nonetheless, in the regressions that follow, we do
correct for possible clustering across observations.
17The average beta resulting from a regression of each touted stock’s return on the Russell Micro-cap
Index return is statistically and economically indistinguishable from zero.
18We do not present data on relative spreads in this table, because later in the paper we speciﬁcally
evaluate a strategy that takes spreads into account. We do note, however, that there is little variation
in spreads within a touting “window,” and that relative spreads are signiﬁcantly lower for touted stocks.
13fall. Figures 2 and 3, respectively, depict returns and abnormal volume for the touted
and control stocks in our sample. For touted stocks, there is a clear pattern that returns
increase through the peak day of touting and deteriorate after, while abnormal volume
is the greatest on the day of and the day after the peak day of touting. There is no such
pattern for the control stocks. Because the negative returns following touting activity
may have nothing to do with the touting per se, but may just be a simple reversion or price
correction after an increase independent of touting activity, we match each touted stock
with non-touted stocks that have a similar increase in price on the days leading to peak
touting for the touted stocks. Matching our stocks to other Pink Sheets stocks proved
di cult because they are so thinly traded. As an alternative, we match each touted
stock with one stock from NASDAQ such that the matched stock is the smallest stock
with the most similar price increase over the relevant days. By construction, the average
price increase for the NASDAQ stocks leading to the peak day of touting is statistically
indistinguishable from that for the touted stocks, but touted stocks subsequently, and
signiﬁcantly, underperform the matched set of NASDAQ stocks.19 This evidence is
consistent with the idea that it is the manipulation of trading activity via spam, coupled
with selling by spammers, that generates a systematic negative return.
Buying by spam recipients need not reﬂect their belief that the tout is true.
Investors who attach even a small probability that price or volume changes are generated
by private information may still trade, which can cause price changes that are unrelated
to fundamentals (Grossman (1989)). Allen and Gale (1992) also show that, even in a
rational framework, so long as investors attach a positive probability to a stock promoter
being an informed trader, the manipulator, whether informed or uninformed, can proﬁt.
As long as an investor believes there will be some response to touting, he may want to
buy even if he knows spam is uninformative, believing that it is still early in the pyramid
scheme and that other recipients will drive the stock price even higher. Our data do
not allow us to distinguish between this model and one in which much of the buying is
19These results are available upon request. Later in the paper, we also match touted stocks to small
NASDAQ stocks by price and trading activity. See Section 3.2.
14motivated solely by the belief that spam reveals information about a stock’s future price
movement.
The standard deviation of our price data is high, reﬂecting the volatile nature
of the Pink Sheets listings, so estimates from our analysis are likely to be noisy (see
also Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2004)). We therefore run a pooled cross-sectional
generalized least squares regression using all observations in our sample period and
adjust our statistics for data clustering.20 We ﬁrst examine daily midpoint return as
the dependent variable. The left hand side of Table 4 refers to the full sample (2004-
2005). From Panel A, we see that the coe cient on “#touts,” which represents the
number of touts on the day the return is measured, is signiﬁcantly positive, 0.10%.
This suggests that each additional tout is associated with an increase in daily return
of 10 basis points. Additionally, looking at what happens in the combined 5 days after
the tout (“cum5”), we see that subsequent returns are signiﬁcantly negative (p-value
<0.0001). The results from the regression are consistent with our hypothesis of why
people spam, and the volume regressions shown in Panel B appear to provide supporting
evidence. The negative coe cient on the variable “tstk” in the full sample suggests that,
on average, touted stocks have slightly lower abnormal volume than do the control stocks.
The signiﬁcantly positive coe cient on “#touts”, however, indicates that touting does
have a signiﬁcantly positive e ect on volume. In this sample, abnormal volume increases
by almost 1% with each additional tout. This abnormal volume associated with touting
remains high in the 5 days following the touting activity.
We also examine our results in the 2004 and 2005 subperiods (shown in the
respective middle and right hand columns). An interesting pattern emerges: in 2005
volume reacts signiﬁcantly more to touting activity. Abnormal volume increases by 1.16%
with each additional tout in 2005, though only by 0.68% in 2004. Though one might think
that the general public would learn over time, resulting in a smaller reaction to touting,
20In our regressions, we cluster by both ticker and date. That is, we correct for the possibility that
returns on a given date may be correlated across stocks, and that, for a given stock, returns around
touting activity may also be correlated.
15it appears that touters may be the ones who learn over time. Additionally, increased
buying by spammees makes it easier for spammers to sell, which may increase volume
further. The fact that returns on the tout day are not as sensitive to each additional
tout (14 basis points in 2004 v. 3 basis points in 2005) is consistent with this idea that at
least some of the spammees’ buying activity is o set by spammers’ selling activity such
that the net e ect on returns is marginal. An increase in sheer volume of spam may also
account for increased buying. In January 2005, 0.8% of spam e-mails were stock touts,
and from January 2005 through June 2005, the proportion of spam that touted stock is
said to have increased by 10% per month.21
Table 5 allows us to further analyze the results in Table 4 by considering touted
stocks only. (Since all stocks in this analysis are touted stocks, we omit the variable “tstk”
from our regressions.) Results for daily midpoint returns and abnormal volume are given
in Panels A and B, respectively. As above, the left hand side of the table refers to all
data (2004-2005), the middle column provides results for 2004, and the right hand side
of the table gives results for 2005. The results are similar to those presented in Table 4:
during the full sample period, returns increase by a statistically signiﬁcant 9 basis points
with each additional tout but are signiﬁcantly lower in the following days. Abnormal
volume increases by nearly 1% with each tout on touted days and remains high following
the tout. Subperiod results for returns and volume follow the same pattern as in Table
4. The e ect of each additional tout on abnormal volume is over 50 basis points greater
in 2005, though the e ect of each additional tout on tout day returns is insigniﬁcant.
Within the group of touted stocks there is great variation on the amount of touting
that takes place, both in sheer number of messages (as represented by multiple reports of
the same spam to NANAS) and in messages over time. Table 6 explores how returns and
the overall economic e ect (measured by the dollar value of transactions in a given day)
21See “Sophos identiﬁes the most prevalent spam categories of 2005,” August 3, 2005, available at
<http://www.sophos.com/presso ce/news/articles/2005/08/pr us 20050803topﬁve-
cats.html> and “Sophos reveals ’dirty dozen’ spam relaying countries,” July 24, 2006, available at
<http://www.sophos.com/presso ce/news/articles/2006/07/dirtydozjul06.html>.
16are a ected by the speciﬁc amount of spam touting, testing the hypothesis that more
reports of stock touting in NANAS on a given day for a given stock represent a more
successful touting e ort by the spammer, that results in a greater impact on the market
for the touted stock. To evaluate this possibility, we split stock-days into quintiles based
on quantity of touting. Table 6 shows that the average number of touts on a given day
for a given stock is 1 for those stock-days in Quintile 1. By construction, this number
monotonically increases to 31.44 for the quintile including those stock-days with the
greatest amount of touting (Quintile 5). The average return is not signiﬁcantly di erent
on the tout day (presumably because increases in volume are from both spammers
and spammees (or, buyers and sellers, respectively)), but both dollar value of trading
activity and dollar value of abnormal trading activity increase substantially. Sattherwhite
di erence in means tests indicate that both dollar value of trading activity and dollar
value of abnormal trading activity are signiﬁcantly greater for the most actively touted
quintile; respective t-statistics are 5.00 and 1.84. The fact that the overall dollar value of
transactions roughly increases with touting activity suggests that the economic e ect of
touting is larger on those days with more touting activity. This distinction is important
because many Pink Sheets stocks are penny stocks so a price increase from, say, $0.01
to $0.03 is 200%, whereas a price increase from $1 to $1.05 (which is a greater dollar
increase) is only a 5% return. Since it represents the total dollar size of the stock’s
market on a given day, the price-multiplied-by-abnormal volume measure accounts for
the fact that lower price stocks can end up with huge returns. Nonetheless, on a given
day, there is, on average, approximately $1,954.69 more traded in strongly touted stocks
than in weakly touted stocks ($3,439.20 v. $1,484.51). Figure 4 depicts the magnitude
of the e ect. Table 6, Panel B gives summary statistics on returns, abnormal volume,
and relative spreads for the most actively touted quintile of stocks. Note that the sample
size is greater than one-ﬁfth of the original sample of tickers because these are the most
actively touted stocks, and any given stock may have more than one observation. In
particular, we see that leading up to the peak day, mean midpoint holding period returns
17(from the day before the touting begins to the peak day of touting) are 3.42% greater for
heavily touted stocks than for control stocks. Subsequently, however, average returns are
roughly 7.61% lower for touted stocks. The increase in abnormal volume on peak day
doubles from the period prior to peak day for touted stocks, whereas abnormal volume
for control stocks actually decreases.
It appears that, despite the volatile and unpredictable behavior of Pink Sheet
stocks, touting activity indeed has explanatory behavior for both returns and trading
activity. It is an empirical regularity that news impacts liquidity (trading activity
increases after earnings announcements, causing spreads to decrease; see Baker and Stein
(2004) or Barber and Odean (2005), among others). At the same time, Pink Sheets is
“o  the beaten path” in that many investors are unaware of the existence of most Pink
Sheet stocks. Our results suggest that one way for an investor trading on Pink Sheets to
change his or her position is to create liquidity, and this is fairly easily done by attracting
attention to the stock via spam. These results buttress the assumption underlying the
Merton (1987) model that investors can only invest in stocks in which they are familiar.
Overall, our results are consistent with the concurrent working paper by B¨ ohme and
Holz (2006) who suggest that, in data from 2005, a signiﬁcantly positive abnormal return
accompanies spam messages but disappears within four days; our results also accord with
the ﬁndings in the concurrent working paper by Hanke and Hauser (2006) who, using
data from 2005, show that stock spam a ects returns, volume, volatility, and spreads.
3.2 Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness tests. We mentioned that we matched the touted stocks
in our Pink Sheets sample with stocks in the smallest decile of NASDAQ ﬁrms. These
results suggest that for leading up to the peak day of touting (i.e., in the period “beg -
1 to peak”), touted stocks statistically and economically outperform the control stocks;
but, subsequently, they statistically and economically underperform the control stocks
following the peak day of touting (i.e., in the period “peak to end + 2”).
18As an additional check, we hand collect the industry data for each touted ﬁrm
in our sample from Pink Sheets. We match each of these ﬁrms with one from the same
industry (determinedby 2-digit SIC code) and repeat the analysis. It is interestingto note
the distribution of ﬁrms across industries. We see from Table 7 that over one-quarter of
the touted ﬁrms (26.63%) are from the Business Services industry. The Communications
industry accounts for approximately 7% of the sample, as does Engineering, Accounting,
Research, Management, and Related Services. Table 8, Panel A provides information
similar to Table 3, Panel A, but matches our ﬁrms by industry.
Using this alternative control group leads to even more signiﬁcant results than in
the original sample. In particular, we see that touted ﬁrms, on average, perform over
1% better per day during the period “beg - 1 to peak”, while in the period “peak to end
+ 2”, they underperform by approximately 1% per day. The t-statistics testing for a
di erence in mean return between these two groups are 3.31 and  3.77, respectively.22
To check our ﬁndings on negative returns, we match stocks based on price and
abnormal volume on the day preceding the peak day of touting. The notion is that stocks
that have a lot of volume may experience abnormally high returns (see Baker and Stein
(2004)). This being the case, a subsequent reversal may just be a result of the stock
“cooling down.” Yet when we perform the analysis matching on similar priced NASDAQ
stocks with similar average daily dollar volume (prior to the touting), the results remain
qualitatively unchanged. In particular, from the day before touting through the peak
day of touting, touted stocks, on average, outperform control stocks by 139 basis points
22We also check if any of our touted stocks are touted by e-mail spam on days that they also appear
on the RagingBull.com message board (as per Antweiler and Frank (2004)). We do this to consider
whether touting may serve as a means to capture investor attention, incremental over the ability of
message boards to do the same. Results for ﬁrms that are touted and on RagingBull.com are available
upon request, but suggest that accounting for the overlap between the touted stock sample and the
sample of stocks that are also mentioned on message boards does not qualitatively alter our ﬁndings.
We also gathered information from Yahoo! and Silicon Investor. Only two of our observations overlapped
with messages in Yahoo! (by ticker-date), and only scarce news for a subset of the period studied in
our paper was available on Silicon Investor. We also search www.google.com, Factiva, and Lexis Nexis
for news articles about the companies in our sample on days they are touted, but ﬁnd no systematic
correlation between news and touting activity.
19per day. A t-statistic of 3.49 indicates this di erence is signiﬁcant. From the peak day
of touting through the 2 day period after the touting ends, again, the touted stocks
signiﬁcantly underperform even this set of control stocks, on the order of 156 basis points
per day. This di erence is also statistically signiﬁcant (t =  4.29).
4 Discussion
The evidence presented in Section 3 suggests not only that some investors actually do
respond to spam stock touts, but they respond in ways that a ect the overall market for
the comparatively illiquid stocks that are the favorites of spammers. The returns rise
with the initial touts and then fall immediately after. In this section we seek to quantify
the magnitude of the e ect. To perform this analysis, we examine the price reactions
to stocks that are “e ectively” touted. In particular, for each group of stock touts, we
determine the average daily concentration of touting. If a stock is touted twelve times
in a three-day window, the average concentration is four; if a stock is touted six times
over a six-day period, its average concentration is one. We then rank groups by average
concentration and examine return and volume reaction over the touting period for the
50% of groups that have the most concentrated touting.
First, let us consider an example from the point of view of the spammer. To
follow this example, refer to Table 9 (sub-panel labeled “beg - 1 to peak”).23 We use
the stock’s daily closing price as reported by Pink Sheets as an indicator of what a
buyer paid or a seller earned on a stock transaction consummated that day. From that
baseline we then adjust the spammer’s proﬁt for transaction costs (ranging from 0 to
10, and also 100, round-trip basis points).24 While buying stock earlier might provide
23As was the case in Table 6, because we are dealing with the most extensively touted stocks, a given
stock may have several touting periods (groups) that have a high concentration of touting. This explains
why the sample size is not equal to 50% of the sample size in Table 3.
24We considered assuming that the spammer buys at the ask price on the day before beginning his
touting, and then liquidates at the bid price on the peak day of touting. However, because Pink Sheets
stocks are so thinly traded, the closing bid and ask data provided to us by Pink Sheets can not reliably
be associated with a recorded transaction the following day. Moreover, a spammer concerned about
20more of an opportunity to buy low, keeping the buying and selling tightly anchored to
the touting might prove an attractive strategy because the touter’s money would not be
tied up in one stock for too long. It might initially appear that because Pink Sheets
stocks in general, and the targets of touters in particular, tend to be illiquid, a spammer
would only be able to transact a small dollar amount at the quoted prices. Our tracking
of volume shows, however, that liquidity is improved signiﬁcantly during heavy tout
periods. Therefore, if the spammer (or the spammer’s client) were to invest according
to this basic practice and to tout enough to create su cient liquidity of a given stock,
returns in this table suggest that his or her net worth would increase approximately 4.29%
in roughly two days, before transaction costs. Assuming a spammer were to invest $1,000
in each of the touted stocks in this sample, expected proﬁts would be nearly $18,018,
before transaction costs.25 If we were to assume a round-trip transaction cost of 2, 4, 6,
8, or 10 basis points, respective average proﬁts would decrease to $17,932.20, $17,846.40,
$17,760.59, $17,674.79, or $17,588.99. And, evenif we considered a round-trip transaction
cost of 1%, a spammer’s expected proﬁt would remain signiﬁcant at $13,727.91. Results
are presented in the lower sub-panel of Table 9. Of course, the volatility of returns
(measured by standard deviation) is higher for touted stocks. Depending on the touter’s
risk aversion level, the greater return may more than compensate for bearing this added
risk.
Now let us consider the returns to an investor who follows the advice of a spammed
tout. Again, refer to Table 9 (sub-panel labeled “peak to end + 2”). On average, if the
victim were to purchase the touted stock at the closing price on the peak day of touting
and sell it at the closing price two days after the touting window ends, he or she would
lose 5.37% before transaction costs. Of course, we do not know that the spammee would
sell the stock 2 days after the touting ends, but casual observation suggests that the Pink
proﬁts is likely watching the market closely to determine the best price at which to unload a position.
This price is unlikely to be the previous day’s closing ask so, if anything, by using closing prices, we may
be understating the proﬁt to the spammer.
25On average, the spammer makes 4.29% on the 420 investment opportunities. It follows that
($1000*420*1.0429) - (420*$1000) would be the spammer’s net gain.
21Sheets stocks do not return to the price level on the day of peak touting for some time.
In the same column, we can see that, if each time the victim saw a touted stock he or
she invested in a randomly selected non-touted Pink Sheets stock, he or she would face
marginally lower idiosyncratic risk and, on average, would make 2.44%.26
The above discussion accounts for spreads but does not include brokerage fees,
which are often ﬂat for the entire transaction irrespective of volume.27 Spammers who
buy and sell in large amounts of money can calibrate the size of their trades accordingly
to make sure they proﬁt despite the broker’s fee, while na¨ ıve spammees who respond to
touting activity are unlikely to be sophisticated enough to minimize these costs (see, for
example, Barber and Odean (2000)).
Overall, our results imply that, in theory, a spammee could proﬁt by forming a
zero-cost portfolio that entails buying non-tout stocks and shorting tout stocks each time
he or she receives a spam touting stock. This strategy would have a high expected return
(7.92%).28 Since Pink Sheets stocks are so thinly traded, however, the spammee is at a
disadvantage to the spammer. He or she could not easily borrow the stock necessary to
short it and he or she does not have the same tools to ensure liquidity when selling.
26It is worth noting that 2.44% is an extremely large return for a typical control sample during the
period “peak to end + 2”. Looking at how the returns to the alternative control samples from NASDAQ
compare to those from the original Pink Sheets control sample (Table 8 and Table 3, respectively) sheds
some light on this issue. In particular, it appears that most NASDAQ stocks have a very low average
daily return (Table 8, Panel A). However, when we examine returns to a NASDAQ matched sample
based on price and abnormal volume (Table 8, Panel B), we see that the returns over this period are
much more similar to (and in fact larger than) those for the Pink Sheets control sample, which suggests
these returns may be compensation for holding extremely low-priced, low-volume, and high-volatility
stocks.
27For example, E*TRADE o ers ﬂat fees as low as $6.99 per order, with no apparent extra fees for
trading additional shares of stocks, such as these, not listed on a national securities exchange.
28This high expected return is likely at least partial compensation to investors for holding relatively
illiquid and small stocks (see, for example, the discussion about an illiquidity premium in Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1996)).
225 Policy Implications
We brieﬂy consider some policy implications of our ﬁnding that stock prices can be
successfully manipulated through spam. In the United States, the prevailing model of
consumer protection is that of disclosure. Those who give advice to the public about
stocks run the risk of sanction by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission or its
state counterparts if they fail to disclose such facts as a material interest they have in the
stocks themselves.29 Interestingly, much of the stock-touting spam we examine, such as
the sample provided in Figure 1, contains boilerplate disclosures such as the statement
that the spammer had been compensated a certain amount of money and shares of stock
by a third party to send out an optimistic tout, and that the spammer (and the third
party) were likely to be selling the very stock touted contemporaneously with the tout
itself. In order for a touter’s (or other entity recommending stocks) substantive claims
to run afoul of the S.E.C., a reasonable person must be thought to believe that the
claims are both true and signiﬁcant (Langevoort (2002)). This standard turns out to
exculpate much of the touting that takes place in the spam we examine. Section 10 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits “manipulative or deceptive devices”
connected with the sale of securities, and forged headers in the typical spam e-mail may
su ce for this. However, the headers of such e-mails are usually from such clearly non-
existent persons that they are better described as anonymous than fraudulent.30 Those
e-mails that purport to be private e-mail between two parties, “accidentally” sent to the
real target through spam, might of course fall under this provision. Pink Sheets C.E.O. R.
Cromwell Coulson has called attention to this type of market manipulation, highlighting
29Some stock tout spammers have been prosecuted under section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933,
on the basis that the spammers did not su ciently disclose their ﬁnancial interests (see, e.g., In Re
James Sheret, Jr., Lit. Rel. No. 16451, 71 S.E.C. Docket 1787 (Feb. 24, 2000)). Walker and Levine
(2001) write that after the S.E.C. began to bring enforcement cases, disclosure “markedly improved.”
Many of our recorded spam reﬂect that improvement – if improvement it is.
30Langevoort (2002) writes that “[t]he fact that a pseudonymous person on a web site says, even
repeatedly, that he thinks that a stock is poised to gain an immense amount does not by itself convey
any seemingly reliable information. In other areas of antifraud litigation under the securities laws, the
courts have dismissed claims involving far more substantive assertions of general optimism than this –
even when made by corporate insiders – as immaterial as a matter of law.”
23the inadequacy of such disclosure, and has asked the S.E.C. to consider rules that would
make this type of stock touting much more di cult.31
Given the disclosure statements, the fact that so much spam is blocked by spam
ﬁlters, and the additional e ort it takes a recipient to place an order, it is striking that
heavy stock touting can actually work. If junk e-mail can ﬁnd its way through ISPs
and client-side ﬁlters to the eyes of Internet users, what kind of response rate might
be expected? For spammers wanting recipients to read and then take some action on
the basis of an e-mail, even a very small response rate might be enough to justify the
modest e ort and expense required to send it.32 Our data suggest a very low response
rate for stock spam, which further highlights the di culties of combating these schemes
using ex post regulatory intervention;33 the e ort required to vindicate the interests of
a few manipulated investors may not be worth it, and the amount of money made on
any given campaign may be modest enough to rate a correspondingly low priority on an
enforcement agenda. Yet the problem is signiﬁcant, as the increasing volume of stock
touting spam and apparent number of campaigns suggests – spammers can make a lot
of money over time, in amounts that are small enough to escape notice but large enough
to be worth accumulating. This suggests that structural solutions designed to lessen the
impact of stock spam may be better than traditional enforcement.
If disclosures meet the requirements of law and yet consumers are still so readily
taken in, regulators might consider more aggressive, and paternalistic, applications of
31See R. Cromwell Coulson, Petition for Commission Action to Protect the Investing Public from
Unlawful and Deceptive Securities Promotions, April 2006, <http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-
519.pdf>.
32Studies such as Karpatkin (1999) suggest that children and teenagers are “easily manipulated” so
are vulnerable to marketing ploys like spam. Yet, given that Barber and Odean (2000) ﬁnd that the
average age of the principal account holder in their sample is approximately 50, it is unlikely that the
people Karpatkin is concerned for are responsible for the trading activity covered in this paper.
33For China World Trade Corp., the most aggressively touted stock in our sample, our data suggest
a total dollar value of trading activity of $36,842.43 on its heaviest day of touting. If we suppose
that the average investor invests $100, since dealers do not double count orders, then we would expect
approximately 360 people to be trading. If we further assume that 10 million spams are sent out for
a given stock, then approximately 36 people per million are responding. This is an extraordinarily low
response rate, even as trading is noticeably a ected.
24law to prohibit such conﬂicts outright, rather than simply requiring disclosure. These
could include requiring additional transactional steps before individuals are permitted to
trade in penny stocks, similar to the written assurances that brokers require from their
clients before permitting them to pursue risky and complex investment activities such as
writing uncovered options. Such steps might su ce as a cooling o  period between the
receipt of a tout and acting upon it. Spammers, to be sure, might then take up more
sustained touting campaigns in order to maintain interest across such cooling o  periods.
Disclosure has not been deemed su cient to protect users in other sectors. For
example, the mere disclosure of odds (and ﬁdelity to them) is typically not legally
su cient for casinos to o er standardized games of chance to the public; instead,
regulators impose minimum payouts by such games to the public, presuming that many
members of the public would not shop among casinos for the best odds if the casinos
had a free hand to set them. Just as casinos must go beyond disclosure and provide
minimum government-mandated “fair” returns to those who gamble, stock touters might
be prohibited from trying to move markets to their advantage using the wealth of
unsophisticated investors, even if they fully disclose their bias – in essence, conceding
the swindle they seek to accomplish in text alongside the touts that are central to the
enterprise.
Finally, those who tout stocks using spam might be singled out for enforcement
under the CAN-SPAM Act, since our review of the spam e-mails indicate failure to abide
by CAN-SPAM’s labeling and opt-out requirements.
6 Conclusion
Based on an archived database of touts drawn from 75,415 likely e-mail tout messages,
themselves drawn from over 1.8 million reports of spam, we document a signiﬁcantly
negative return following days of heavy spam touting of a stock. We provide evidence of
an average positive return over the period that begins the day before touting is initiated
25through the peak day of touting activity. Volume responds positively and signiﬁcantly
to touting. The evidence is consistent with the notion that spammers tout stocks to
increase demand and perhaps price enough to unload previously-secured positions at
a proﬁt. Selling pressure on the part of the spammer then results in negative returns
following intense touting. The implication of this is that the investors who respond to
heavy touting are, on average, losing approximately 5.50% over the few days that follow
aggressive touting. When aggregated across touts, the dollar value of this loss may be
signiﬁcant. The fact that losses are greater for those stocks that are touted most heavily
underscores the notion that heavy touting via spam can have an e ect on trading activity
and returns. Our results also accord with a model put forward in Hong and Huang (2005)
where insiders who participate in highly illiquid markets may engage in costly activities
in order to liquidate their positions without signiﬁcant price impact.
Overall, our analysis shows that spam works. Among its millions of recipients are
not only those who read it, but who also act upon it, suggesting a value to spamming
that will create a powerful counterbalance to regulatory and technical e orts to contain
it.
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29Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on price, volume, and bid-ask spread data for the stocks in our sample. Under the
column “Stock”, All refers to the full sample of stocks in our analysis, Touted refers to those stocks that are touted in an
e-mail, and Control indicates randomly selected stocks from the Pink Sheets exchange for which there are no touts in our
sample. For each ticker, we obtain the average of each variable (price, volume, etc.). The summary statistics in the table
are based on those averages. Under # Tickers, we give the number of unique companies in each sample. Price is closing
price, Volume is share volume, Spread is the ask price less the bid on the closing trade, and % Spread is spread/price.
Di erence represents the di erence in means between the Touted and Control groups for each variable. T-stat refers to
the Satterwhite t-statistic testing whether each di erence in means is signiﬁcant. All data are from January, 2004 - July,
2005.
Variable Stock # Tickers Mean Median St Dev Min Max
Price All 829 0.87 0.25 1.64 0.00 12.60
Touted 304 0.67 0.30 0.92 0.00 5.68
Control 525 0.99 0.22 1.93 0.00 12.60
Di erence  0.32
T-stat  3.19
Volume All 829 2,471.32 2,766.60 1,255.52 0.82 5,110.33
Touted 304 2,876.40 3,157.09 1,001.03 0.82 4,740.29
Control 525 2,236.75 2,370.32 1,327.05 3.55 5,110.33
Di erence 639.65
T-stat 7.84
Spread All 814 0.10 0.03 0.23 0.00 2.99
Touted 292 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.00 1.51
Control 522 0.11 0.03 0.27 0.00 2.99
Di erence  0.04
T-stat  3.08
% Spread All 812 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.00 3.09
Touted 291 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.00 1.37
Control 521 0.28 0.19 0.34 0.00 3.09
Di erence  0.09
T-stat  5.05
30Table 2: Initial Evidence on the Relevance of Touting for Trading Activity
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the touted and control stocks in our sample on both days that experience a tout
and days that do not. Panel A gives results deﬁning dollar value of trading activity as closing price multiplied by share
volume. Panel B provides data in terms of dollar value of abnormal trading activity, which is measured by closing price
multiplied by abnormal share volume. Abnormal share volume for each stock is obtained by subtracting the stock’s mean
volume over the sample period from its daily dollar volume, standardized by its mean volume. If a “No” appears under
the column labeled “Tout Day,” then no stock is touted on that day, but if a “Yes” appears in the column, then there is
a stock tout on that day. The column labeled “Stock” indicates whether the stocks for which the summary statistics are
calculated are touted or control stocks. N gives the number of unique tickers in each group, Pr*Vol is the average of share
price multiplied by share volume, Pr*AbnVol is the mean of price multiplied by abnormal share volume. St Dev is the
standard deviation of Pr*Vol (Panel A) or Pr*AbnVol (Panel B), and Percent indicates the proportion of times that the
relevant type of stock (touted or control) is the most actively traded stock on the relevant day (touted or not touted). For
the averages,   denotes signiﬁcance at the   = 5% level. All data are from January, 2004 - July, 2005.
Panel A: Dollar Value of Trading Activity
Tout Day Stock N Pr*Vol St Dev Percent
No Touted 20 41,101.80  8,508.38 0.04
No Control 446 56,152.06  18,151.89 0.96
Di erence 15,050.26
T-stat 7.21
.
Yes Touted 260 11,118.84  10,853.53 0.70
Yes Control 114 13,975.80  11,982.90 0.30
Di erence 2,856.96
T-stat 2.18
Panel B: Dollar Value of Abnormal Trading Activity
Tout Day Stock N Pr*AbnVol St Dev Percent
No Touted 171 64.48  53.45 0.37
No Control 295 53.16  56.52 0.63
Di erence  11.31
T-stat  2.16
.
Yes Touted 278 2.90  4.30 0.74
Yes Control 96 4.38  7.38 0.26
Di erence 1.48
T-stat 1.86
31Table 3: “Group Level” Summary Statistics around Tout Days
Table 3 presents “group-level” summary statistics on the variables in our sample around days on which there is a stock
tout. A group is deﬁned as a period of touting activity with no more than 5 consecutive days without a tout. The peak
day is deﬁned as the day within a group with the heaviest touting. “Beg - 1 to Peak” represents the period from the
day before the beginning of the group of touts through the peak day of touting within each group. Peak day is the day
within each group with the heaviest touting, and “Peak to End + 2” represents the period from the peak day of touting
through two days after the touting within each group ends. N is the number of ticker-groups, MPR represents the average
of the holding period midpoint return over the relevant period, and AbnVol is the average of abnormal volume across
stocks, where abnormal volume is measured as a stock’s daily dollar volume less its mean volume over the sample period,
standardized by its mean volume. For the averages,   denotes signiﬁcance at the   = 5% level. All data are from January
2004 - July, 2005.
Group Level Results
Stock N MPR St Dev AbnVol St Dev
Peak day . .
Touted 680 0.0014 0.1345 0.6453  3.7001
Control 481 0.0038 0.0899  0.0532 1.8446
Di erence  0.0023 0.6985
T-stat  0.36 4.23
Beg-1 to Peak .
Touted 680 0.0083  0.0821 0.4028  2.1187
Control 495 0.0013 0.0563  0.0299 1.1573
Di erence 0.0070 0.4327
T-stat 1.74 4.49
Peak to End+2 . .
Touted 680  0.0085 0.0547 0.5206  2.2672
Control 496 0.0021 0.0472 0.0682 1.7492
Di erence  0.0106 0.4524
T-stat  3.55 3.86
Beg-1 to End+2 . .
Touted 680  0.0031 0.0494 0.4410  1.8693
Control 497 0.0016 0.0383 0.0429 1.3277
Di erence  0.0047 0.3981
T-stat  1.84 4.27
32Table 4: Impact of Touting on Returns & Volume for Full Sample
Table 4 gives results for a pooled cross-sectional, time-series generalized least squares regression for the entire sample
period, 2004 only, and 2005 only, on all stocks in our sample. The left hand side of the table refers to the entire sample
period, the middle panel gives results for observationsfrom 2004, and the right hand side panel gives results for observations
in 2005 only. Panel A uses midpoint return as the dependent variable and Panel B gives results using abnormal volume
as the dependent variable. Abnormal volume is measured as a stock’s daily dollar volume less its mean volume over the
sample period, standardized by its mean volume. Int denotes intercept and tstk is a dummy variable that takes on the
value 1 if the stock is touted and zero otherwise. #touts is a variable that represents the number of touts on a given date,
and cum5 is a variable that represents the cumulative e ect of touting in the 5 days after touting occurs. Standard errors
are adjusted for clustering. # tickers gives the number of unique tickers used in each regression.
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Daily Return
All Est Error Pr >| Z | 2004 Est Error Pr >| Z | 2005 Est Error Pr >| Z |
int 0.0099 0.0011 <.0001 int 0.0237 0.0056 <.0001 int 0.0057 0.0041 0.1607
tstk  0.0090 0.0077 0.2412 tstk  0.0166 0.0132 0.2094 tstk 0.0014 0.0015 0.3448
#touts 0.0010 0.0004 0.0093 #touts 0.0014 0.0006 0.0136 #touts 0.0003 0.0003 0.3663
cum5  0.0004 0.0001 <.0001 cum5  0.0004 0.0001 <.0001 cum5  0.0003 0.0001 0.0008
# tickers 798 712 628
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Abnormal Volume
All Est Error Pr >| Z | 2004 Est Error Pr >| Z | 2005 Est Error Pr >| Z |
int 0.8626 0.0034 <.0001 int 0.5985 0.0180 <.0001 int 0.5057 0.0857 <.0001
tstk  0.0021 0.0243 0.9310 tstk  0.0071 0.0414 0.8631 tstk 0.0027 0.0140 0.8479
#touts 0.0088 0.0042 0.0372 #touts 0.0068 0.0061 0.2703 #touts 0.0116 0.0048 0.0166
cum5 0.0023 0.0010 0.0198 cum5 0.0011 0.0014 0.4125 cum5 0.0040 0.0013 0.0027
# tickers 792 706 624
33Table 5: Impact of Touting on Returns & Volume for Touted Stocks Only
Table 5 gives results for a pooled cross-sectional, time-series generalized least squares regression for the entire sample
period, 2004 only, and 2005 only, for touted stocks only. Results are presented in the left-hand-side, middle, and right-
hand side of the table, respectively. Panel A gives results using midpoint return as the dependent variable and Panel B
gives results using abnormal volume as the dependent variable. Abnormal volume is measured as a stock’s daily dollar
volume less its mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its mean volume. Int denotes intercept, #touts is a
variable that represents the number of touts on a given date, and cum5 is a variable that represents the cumulative e ect
of touting in the 5 days after touting occurs. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering. #tickers gives the number of
unique stocks used in each regression.
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Daily Return
All Est Error Pr >| Z | 2004 Est Error Pr >| Z | 2005 Est Error Pr >| Z |
int 0.0143 0.0000 <.0001 int 0.0208 0.0000 <.0001 int 0.0031 0.0044 0.4797
#touts 0.0009 0.0004 0.0220 #touts 0.0012 0.0006 0.0349 #touts 0.0003 0.0003 0.3421
cum5  0.0004 0.0001 <.0001 cum5  0.0004 0.0001 <.0001 cum5  0.0003 0.0001 0.0007
# tickers 289 251 269
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Abnormal Volume
All Est Error Pr >| Z | 2004 Est Error Pr >| Z | 2005 Est Error Pr >| Z |
int 0.3420 0.0000 <.0001 int 0.5876 0.0001 <.0001 int 0.4541 0.0667 <.0001
#touts 0.0088 0.0043 0.0378 #touts 0.0070 0.0062 0.2618 #touts 0.0115 0.0048 0.0166
cum5 0.0024 0.0010 0.0130 cum5 0.0015 0.0014 0.2660 cum5 0.0037 0.0013 0.0046
# tickers 288 250 266
34Table 6: Touting Activity Quintiles
In Table 6, quintiles are formed based on daily touting activity. Quintile 5 (Quintile 1) represents the stock-days with the
heaviest (lightest) amount of touting. Panel A gives the sample size for each quintile (based on stock-days), the average
number of touts, average return, and average dollar value of trading activity (normal and abnormal) for each quintile.
Values are calculated on tout days only. Vol is share volume, and AbnVol is abnormal share volume, measured as a stock’s
daily dollar volume less its mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its mean volume. Panel B presents
“group-level” summary statistics on the variables in our sample for tickers in our sample that have the highest amount
of touting activity around days that experience a tout. A group is deﬁned as a period of touting during which there are
no more than 5 days without a tout. N is the number of ticker-groups, Group Ret represents the holding period return
(calculated from spread midpoints) over the relevant period. The peak day is deﬁned as the day within a group with the
heaviest touting. “Beg - 1 to Peak” represents the period from the day before the beginning of the group of touts through
the peak day of touting within each group. Peak day is the day within each group with the heaviest touting, and “Peak
to End + 2” represents the period from the peak day of touting through two days after the group of touts ends. In Panel
B, for the averages,   denotes signiﬁcance at the   = 5% level. All data are from January, 2004 - July, 2005.
Panel A: Summary Statistics by Quintile
Quintile Stock-Days Avg Touts Ret Pr*Vol Pr*AbnVol
1 847 1.00  0.41 1,484.51 110.79
2 367 2.00 1.00 1,763.44 308.89
3 465 3.81  0.53 2,010.44 404.68
4 363 8.30 0.24 2,220.50 503.65
5 404 31.44 0.79 3,439.20 651.63
Di  Q5-Q1 1.20 1,954.69 540.84
T-stat 1.26 5.00 1.84
Panel B: Quintile Group Level Results
Stock N Group Ret St Dev AbnVol St Dev
Peak day . .
Touted 306 0.0077 0.1505 0.3630  1.5510
Control 481  0.0058 0.0784  0.1237 1.1029
Di erence 0.0135 0.4867
T-stat 1.45 4.77
Beg-1 to Peak . .
Touted 306 0.0296 0.2605 0.1863  1.0783
Control 496  0.0046 0.1390  0.0368 1.2062
Di erence 0.0342 0.2230
T-stat 2.12 2.72
Peak to End+2 . .
Touted 306  0.0619 0.2529 0.2813  1.0032
Control 496 0.0142 0.5939  0.0084 0.9320
Di erence  0.0761 0.2897
T-stat  2.51 4.08
Beg-1 to End+2 . .
Touted 306  0.0454 0.2976 0.2335  0.8976
Control 500 0.0151 0.6072 0.0005 0.8994
Di erence  0.0605 0.2330
T-stat  1.89 3.57
35Table 7: Industry Classiﬁcations
Table 7 shows the distribution of the touted stocks in our sample across industries, as determined by 2-digit SIC code.
The 2-digit SIC code is given in the leftmost column, the industry description is provided in the middle column, and the
percentage of stocks in our sample that falls in the relevant industry is given in the rightmost column. The sample period
is January, 2004 - July, 2005.
SIC Industry Description Percent
73 Business Services 26.63%
48 Communications 7.05%
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 7.05%
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 6.27%
36 Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment 5.48%
13 Oil And Gas Extraction 5.22%
20 Food And Kindred Products 4.18%
79 Amusement And Recreation Services 4.18%
80 Health Services 4.18%
10 Metal Mining 3.13%
38 Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments 2.87%
35 Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 2.35%
49 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 2.09%
62 Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services 2.09%
23 Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 1.83%
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1.83%
14 Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 1.31%
27 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 1.31%
67 Holding And Other Investment O ces 1.31%
75 Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 1.31%
29 Petroleum Reﬁning And Related Industries 1.04%
37 Transportation Equipment 0.78%
65 Real Estate 0.78%
78 Motion Pictures 0.78%
15 Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders 0.52%
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 0.52%
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Transportation Equipment 0.52%
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service 0.52%
81 Legal Services 0.52%
82 Educational Services 0.52%
12 Coal Mining 0.26%
40 Railroad Transportation 0.26%
50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 0.26%
51 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 0.26%
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 0.26%
60 Depository Institutions 0.26%
72 Personal Services 0.26%
36Table 8: Alternative Control Groups
Table 8 presents summary statistics on the variables in our sample around days that experience a tout. Panel A refers to
“group-level” results, with control ﬁrms from the smallest decile of NASDAQ stocks matched by 2-digit SIC industry code.
Panel B refers to “group-level” results, with the control ﬁrms matched by price and abnormal volume, from the smallest
decile of NASDAQ stocks. A group is deﬁned as a period with fewer than 5 days without a tout. The peak day is deﬁned
as the day within a group with the heaviest touting. N is the number of ticker-groups, MPR represents the average daily
return calculated from spread midpoints, and AbnVol is abnormal volume, measured as a stock’s daily dollar volume less
its mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its mean volume. “Beg - 1 to Peak” represents the period from
the day before the beginning of the group of touts through the day of the tout. Peak day is the day of the heaviest touting,
and “Peak to End + 2” represents the day of heaviest touting through the two days after the group of touts ends. For the
means,   denotes signiﬁcance at the   = 5% level. Our sample period is January, 2004 - July, 2005.
Panel A: NASDAQ Control Stocks Matched by 2 - Digit SIC Code
Stock N MPR St Dev AbnVol St Dev
Peak day . .
Touted 680 0.0014 0.1345 0.6453 3.7001
Control 536  0.0030 0.0385  0.1080 1.7339
Di erence 0.0044 0.7533
T-stat 0.81 4.70
Beg-1 to Peak . .
Touted 680 0.0083  0.0821 0.4028  2.3027
Control 549  0.0028 0.0279 0.0355 2.2378
Di erence 0.0112 0.3673
T-stat 3.31 2.93
Peak to End+2 . .
Touted 680  0.0085 0.0547 0.5206  2.5622
Control 548 0.0004 0.0263 0.2109 4.0439
Di erence  0.0090 0.3097
T-stat  3.77 1.60
Beg-1 to End+2 . .
Touted 680  0.0031 0.0494 0.4410  2.1423
Control 549  0.0004 0.0217 0.2038 3.2814
Di erence  0.0026 0.2372
T-stat  1.25 1.51
Panel B: NASDAQ Control Stocks Matched by Price and Abnormal Volume
Stock N MPR St Dev AbnVol St Dev
Peak day . .
Touted 680 0.0014 0.1345 0.6453 3.7001
Control 91  0.0164 0.0844 2.0333  9.3911
Di erence 0.0178  1.3880
T-stat 1.74  1.40
Beg-1 to Peak . .
Touted 680 0.0083  0.0821 0.4028  2.1187
Control 173  0.0056 0.0321 0.3586 3.5872
Di erence 0.0139 0.0442
T-stat 3.49 0.16
Peak to End+2 . .
Touted 680  0.0085 0.0547 0.5206  2.2672
Control 260 0.0071  0.0481 1.0302  3.8657
Di erence  0.0156  0.5095
T-stat  4.29  2.00
Beg-1 to End+2 . .
Touted 680  0.0031 0.0494 0.4410  1.8693
Control 260 0.0045  0.0341 0.8798  3.2731
Di erence  0.0076  0.4388
T-stat  2.66  2.04
37Table 9: Touting Strategy
Table 9 presents summary statistics on returns and volume to a strategy that takes advantage of the most e ective touting
strategy. Results are at the “group-level.” Control stocks are determined in the same way as in Table 1. A group is deﬁned
as a period with fewer than 5 days without a tout. The peak day is deﬁned as the day within a group with the heaviest
touting. “Beg - 1 to Peak” represents the period from the day before the beginning of the group of touts through the
day of the tout. Peak day is the day of the heaviest touting, and “Peak to End + 2” represents day of heaviest touting
through the two days after the group of touts ends. N is the number of ticker-groups, HPR represents the average return
for the group-level results, and is calculated by buying and selling at the closing price on the speciﬁed days. AbnVol is
abnormal volume, measured as a stock’s daily dollar volume less its mean volume over the sample period, standardized by
its mean volume. In the lower sub-panel of the table, we present the hypothetical proﬁt (in dollars) to a spammer who
invests $1000 in each touted stock on the day before the peak day of touting and liquidates his position on the peak day
of touting, assuming round-trip transaction costs ranging from 0 to 100 basis points. Our sample period is January, 2004
- July, 2005.
Stock N HPR StDev AbnVol StDev % Spread StDev
Peak day
Touted 420 0.0030 0.1400 0.8278 4.3115 0.1335 0.1683
Control 297 0.0077 0.0934  0.0173 1.9845 0.2642 0.3188
Di erence  0.0047 0.8451  0.1308
T-stat  0.54 3.52  6.46
Beg-1 to Peak
Touted 420 0.0429 0.2741 0.4898 2.4548 0.1381 0.1497
Control 305 0.0063 0.1439  0.0160 1.1958 0.2574 0.3098
Di erence 0.0366 0.5058  0.1193
T-stat 2.33 3.67  6.22
Peak to End+2
Touted 420  0.0537 0.2482 0.6266 2.6578 0.1327 0.1389
Control 306 0.0132 0.2491 0.0475 1.9771 0.2587 0.3166
Di erence  0.0669 0.5791  0.1260
T-stat  3.58 3.37  6.52
Beg-1 to End+2
Touted 420  0.0203 0.3179 0.5233 2.1987 0.1344 0.1340
Control 306 0.0112 0.2640 0.0315 1.4807 0.2582 0.3132
Di erence  0.0315 0.4918  0.1238
T-stat  1.46 3.60  6.50
One-Way Cost 0 1 2 3 4 5 50
Proﬁt 18018.00 17932.20 17846.40 17760.59 17674.79 17588.99 13727.91
38Figure 1: Spam E-mail Touting Stock
Figure 1 gives an example of spam e-mail touting a stock (CWTD).
From nanas-sub@cybernothing.org Thu Mar 18 10:14:16 2004
X-Persona:
Received: from broadtech.co.nz (d233-64-140-225.dnv.wideopenwest.com [64.233.225.140]) by mail-
cyber.law.harvard.edu with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail Service Version 5.5.2653.13)  id
1Y7PFFVG; Thu, 18 Mar 2004 10:13:29 –0500
Message-ID:
From: "Johnathon I. Hathaway"
To: zittrain@cyber.law.harvard.edu
Subject: Strong Buy Alert: CWTD    my8zupb
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 13:09:47 +0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html
  Financial Insiders Report
  Mid-Week Report    
If you loved your  900  percent gains   on our stock pick last week, we think our next pick,   China World Trade Corp. "CWTD",
will do even better !!
Strong-Buy Alert !
 *Breaking News in the Previous 2 weeks*
CWTD Makes Application to list on Amex
China World Trade Corp Signs Letter of Intent to  Acquire Controlling Stake of Guangdong Huahao Industries Holdings Limited  
China World Trade Corp.  ticker:  "CWTD"
   CHINA WORLD TRADE CORP.
 Symbol: CWTD OTC.BB
 Price $4.80  <THIS WAS PROFILED AT 1.50 2 WEEKS AGO>
 Shares out:  16Million
 Market Capitalization: $ 19Million
 Significant Revenue Growth in 2004
 Average PE Industry: 30x
 Rating: Strong Buy
 7 days trading target:  $6.50
 30 day trading target:  $7.50
  Investment Outlook
•  CWTD HAS A STRONG MANAGEMENT TEAM THAT INCLUDES TOP   LOCAL CORPORATE OFFICERS, HIGH RANKING
SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SENIOR  MANAGEMENT FROM THE HONG KONG WORLD TRADE CENTER
•  IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO  CHINA HAS INCREASED  FROM 0.92 BILLION
USD IN 1983 TO 52.74 BILLION USD IN 2004   
•  CWTD IS FIRMLY POSITIONED TO VASTLY EXPAND ITS MARKETING AND ACQUISITION  STRATEGIES AND CAPITALIZE
ON ASIA'S MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR  EMERGING MARKET.
•  CWTD HAS JUST MADE THE APPLICATION TO  LIST ON THE AMEX!!!
•  CHINA WORLD TRADE CORP  SIGNS LETTER OF INTENT TO ACQUIRE CONTROLLING STAKE OF GUANGDONG HUAHAO
INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS LIMITED  
CWTD  is our PLAY OF THE MONTH stock pick.
Here are a few simple reasons why one would own China World Trade Corp:  
•  China World Trade Corporation is an official operator of World Trade Centers in China, in association with The World Trade Centers Association
(WTCA) and offers an enormous variety of services for businesses and industries seeking to do business in China.
•  The Company's business model consists of three major components -- The World Trade Center business, value-added services, and strategic
investments.
•  China World Trade Corporation established the first World Trade Center in the province of Guangzhou (Canton) in the year 2002 and started the
commercial operation at the beginning of 2003. This significant event was covered in detail on CNN ASIA.
•  With the recent tragic events of 9-11, the name World Trade Center has instant global recognition, and stands for unity, strength and prosperity
throughout the worlds top economy leaders.
•  China World Trade Corp Signs Letter of Intent to Acquire Controlling Stake of Guangdong Huahao Industries Holdings Limited
•  CWTD's business potential is built upon the opportunity created by the international trade of  China.
Don't be sorry next week that you forgot to buy this one!
China World Trade  Corp. is uniquely positioned and capitalizing on the rapidly expanding asian  markets!
Investors take note, Get in early !
Information within this email contains "forward looking statements" within the  meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21B of the  Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Any statements that express or involve  discussions with respect to predictions, goals, expectations, beliefs, plans,  projections, objectives, assumptions or future events or
performance are not  statements of historical fact and may be "forward looking statements."   
  Forward looking statements are based on expectations, estimates and projections  at the time the statements are made that involve a number of risks and  uncertainties which could
cause actual results or events to differ materially  from those presently anticipated. Forward looking statements in this action may  be identified through the use of words such as:
"projects", "foresee",  "expects", "estimates," "believes," "understands" "will", "anticipates," or that  by statements indicating certain actions "may," "could," or "might" occur. All
information provided within this email pertaining to investing, stocks,  securities must be understood as information provided and not investment advice.  WE advise all readers and
subscribers to seek advice from a registered  professional securities representative before deciding to trade in stocks  featured within this email. None of the material within this report
shall be  construed as any kind of investment advice.  GS Research and/or its officers and  employees have been compensated 50,000 open trade shares by a third party for  work
involved in the preparation and production of this report
 In compliance with Section 17(b), we disclose the holding of independently  purchased shares of the company mentioned prior to the publication of this  report.. Be aware of an inherent
conflict of interest resulting from such  holdings due to our intent to profit from the liquidation of these shares.  Shares may be sold at any time, even after positive statements have been
made  regarding the above company.  Short term trading targets are only guesses on our  part. Keep in mind that when trading small stocks like the company above there  is a chance
you will lose every penny you invest.  Furthermore there have been  times in the past when the Company itself tells lies, gives false information  and puts out false news.   This email is
for entertainment purposes only.  This  is not investment advice. We suggest you check with an investment professional  before investing any stocks or mutual funds.
39Figure 2: Returns to Touted and Control Stocks
Figure 2 plots average daily returns and cumulative returns for Touted and Control stocks in an 11 day window around
a stock tout (where day 0 marks the event day when a stock is touted). Returns are calculated from daily closing prices.
Event days are plotted on the X-axis and returns (in decimals) are given on the Y-axis. Touted stocks in our sample are
stocks for which a tout e-mail is reported in our database. On each event day, one control stock for which there are no
reported touts during our sample period is picked at random out of an already randomly selected group of Pink Sheets
stocks. The sample period is January, 2004 - July, 2005.
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40Figure 3: Abnormal Volume of Trading in Touted and Control Stocks
Figure 3 plots average daily abnormal volume and cumulative abnormal volume for Touted and Control stocks in an 11
day window around a stock tout (where day 0 marks the event day when a stock is touted). Abnormal volume is measured
as a stock’s daily dollar volume less its mean volume (over the sample period) standardized by its mean volume. Event
days are plotted on the X-axis and abnormal dollar volume is given on the Y-axis. Touted stocks in our sample are stocks
for which a tout e-mail is reported in our database. On each event day, one control stock for which there are no reported
touts during our sample period is picked at random out of an already randomly selected group of Pink Sheets stocks. The
sample period is January, 2004 - July, 2005.
Abnormal Volume
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Event Day
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
Cont AbnVol Tout AbnVol Cont CumAbnVol Tout CumAbnVol
41Figure 4: Trading Activity for Touted Stocks Grouped by Tout Volume
Figure 4 plots average daily trading activity and average daily abnormal trading activity for stocks in each touting activity
quintile. Quintiles are determined by ranking stock-days by touting activity. Quintile 5 (Quintile 1) has the most (least)
touting activity. The quintile is given on the X-axis. Average dollar value of trading activity (Left Y-Axis) is determined
by price multiplied by share volume. Average dollar value of abnormal trading activity (Right Y-Axis) is determined by
price multiplied by abnormal volume, where abnormal volume is measured as a stock’s daily dollar volume less its mean
volume (over the sample period) standardized by its mean volume. The sample period is January, 2004 - July, 2005.
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